What about Bambi? : an examination of the evidential problem of evil.

Date of Award


Document Type



College of Liberal Arts

Degree Name

Bachelor in Arts


Does the existence of pointless or meaningless evils in the world provide us with enough evidence to conclude that it is improbable that God does not exist? This question posed by William Rowe is the basis for the evidential argument of evil. According to Rowe, there appears to be instances of pointless suffering-such as a fawn suffering horrible burns before death-which achieve no good or prevent no worse evil. From this he concludes that God does not exist. Stephen Wykstra, a skeptical theist, objects to Rowe's claim that God does not exist on the basis that we are in no position to know God's choices. In this paper, I aim to show that Wykstra's skeptical response to Rowe's evidential argument is valid; from this we can conclude that the alleged problem of evil is not a problem for the theist.